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DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [KPKO](#) [UN](#) [AU](#) [SU](#) [ER](#)

SUBJECT: DENG ALOR SEES CHANGES IN NCP POSITIONS

Classified By: CDA A. Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

NCP Slowly Recognizing "New Reality"

¶11. (C) In an introductory meeting with CDA Fernandez, Minister of Cabinet Affairs Deng Alor characterized the National Congress Party (NCP) as split between those who acknowledged the "new reality" of Sudan--where the NCP could no longer make unilateral decisions and needed to engage in dialogue with the international community--and those who opposed a robust UN peace-keeping force in Darfur. While President Bashir was trying to bridge this divide, Alor said that it was clear from the recent acceptance of the hybrid that momentum had shifted to the first, more moderate camp. Though the hawks in the Government maintained that the UN/AU hybrid could deploy without UN command and control, Alor said "that this is not a serious thing now that Bashir has made a decision to allow the UN in."

¶12. (C) The CDA said that the NCP "should not be paralyzed" by a distrust of the West. The U.S. had no conspiratorial intentions in Sudan, and the international community had reasonable demands: an end to the crisis in Darfur and the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The U.S. was not asking for the NCP to relinquish power or "commit suicide" but constant delays in choosing the reasonable course risked realizing the NCP hard-liners' worst fears. A solution to the Darfur conflict is in its interests, the CDA explained. Noting the growing militarization of the internally-displaced persons camps, he predicted that the NCP could ultimately lose control if the crisis is not solved.

¶13. (C) Alor concurred and said that the Darfur "rebellion" could expand into Kordofan. In addition, the "internal opposition" exploited the NCP's mistakes. The hard-liners' policies were counterproductive and could inadvertently bring down the Government. There was always a chance of an internal coup by hard-liners. Alor asserted, however, that the NCP was changing, "slowly, but it's changing." Several influential NCP members had asked for the assistance of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) in defusing tensions with the West and with the U.S. in particular. Alor has told them that the SPLM would facilitate dialogue but that the NCP should realize that its policies have created enemies. The CDA suggested that both the U.S. and Sudan should look at each other's actions, not their public comments, as an indication of their intentions and noted that Amb. Khalilzad had said during his recent visit to Khartoum that positive actions from Sudan would be reciprocated by positive responses from the international community.

Abyei Discussions Gain Focus

¶14. (C) Abyei has dominated recent discussions between the NCP and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), said Alor.

While the NCP still rejects the findings of the Abyei Border Commission, Vice President Ali Osman Taha suggested that the two parties set aside the report and come to a "political solution." After discussions on this track yielded no results, Alor accused the NCP of being "separatists in their thinking" if they refused to resolve the Abyei dispute because of their fear of losing the North's only major source of oil in 2011. Taha conceded that the NCP would acquiesce on the border if the oil issue was addressed. He recommended the establishment of a four-member commission, to include himself and Alor, to examine a two-pillared approach to overcoming the dispute: 1) A percentage of Abyei's oil revenues would be transferred to the Government of National Unity (GNU) from the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) and 2) Either a joint fund or two separate funds would be established for development projects in both Abyei and for the Masseriya to which the GNU, the GoSS, and the international community would contribute. Though GoSS Vice President Riek Machar referred to this as "buying the land," Alor said that discussions were ongoing.

SPLM Darfur Conference

¶15. (C) Alor reiterated the SPLM's efforts to organize a conference in Southern Sudan to prepare the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories for a constructive peace

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process as well as the SPLM's support for the United Nations and African Union to lead final negotiations. He said that the SPLM was trying to regroup after its conference was postponed but was optimistic about it occurring within the next few weeks. Alor reported that First Vice President Salva Kiir had met with Eritrean officials in recent days. He said that Eritrea intended to exclude the international community from the negotiating process and that the NCP supported the Eritrean initiative because Khartoum valued its relationship with Asmara. CDA responded that Sudan should be more concerned about its relationship with the U.S. and urged Alor to underscore the importance of Sudan supporting the UN/AU peace process. Alor heartily agreed.

FERNANDEZ